
# Interactive Learning with Pricing for Optimal and Stable Allocation in Markets INFORMS 2022

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(Joint work with Efe Erginbas and Kannan Ramchandran)



Point of interest recommendations



Ride sharing and Delivery



E-commerce



Labor markets


## Main Challenges

- Large scale of operation
- User preferences unknown
- Learn user preferences and make recommendations
  - Exploit structure in preferences (eg. collaborative filtering)
  - Learn from interactive feedback (eg. multi-armed bandits, contextual bandits)
- Drawbacks:
  - Ignorant of capacity constraints
  - Results in overcrowding

## Main Challenges

- Price discovery and allocation
  - Competitive equilibrium, Walras tatonnement process, dynamic pricing
  - Maximize social welfare
  - Envy-free and individually rational
- Drawbacks:
  - Assumes complete information
  - Assumes users can provide high dimensional responses

## Market Aware Recommendation Systems



## Our Approach

- Collaborative filtering: latent factor models
- Explore-exploit: OFU (optimism in face of uncertainty)
- Equilibrium pricing: Walrasian pricing

First to integrate all three aspects in one algorithm

## What our Algorithm Achieves

- Has sub-linear social welfare regret across iterations
  - maximizing social welfare at each step is not possible since preferences are unknown
- Has sub-linear instability regret from user envy:
  - a user is said to have envy if she prefers a non-recommended item and measured by the difference in reward surplus when compared to the recommended item
- We provide theoretical guarantees

# Setup

#### **Modeling User Preferences**


See See		
0.8	0.6	0.2
0.9	0.5	0.1
0.2	0.3	0.6
0.3	0.4	0.5


Items have limited capacities


## Setup

#### Interactive recommendation, allocation, and feedback

At each step a subset of users are active







## A Generic Algorithm

#### Interactive Learning for Allocation and Pricing (ILAP)

- Based on the collected information so far, find the least square estimate of the reward matrix under the structural conditions on preferences
- Consider confidence set around it with an appropriately defined metric and radius
- Optimistically solve the resource allocation problem with constraints assuming that the true rewards belong to this set
- Present the users with these allocations as recommendations at the corresponding shadow prices

# Setting 1

#### **Contextual Preferences**

- Each item has a feature vector (known) (dim R)
- Each user has a feature vector (unknown) (dim R)
- A user-item reward is the linear product of these feature vectors
- These structural properties affect the first step in finding least squares estimate and the radius of confidence set
- Result: Avg. social welfare regret and instability regret of order

$$\tilde{O}\left(\frac{\sqrt{NMnR}}{\sqrt{T}}\right)$$

$${\it max}$$
 max number of active users at any step  $M$  number of items  $N$  number of users  $T$  step number

## Setting 2

#### **Low Rank Preferences**

- We do not assume the item features to be known
- We assume the reward matrix to be of rank R
- Result: Avg. social welfare regret and instability regret of order

$$\tilde{O}\left(\frac{\sqrt{NM(N+M)R}}{\sqrt{T}}\right) \begin{array}{c} n & \text{max number of active users at any step} \\ M & \text{number of items} \\ N & \text{number of users} \\ T & \text{step number} \end{array} \right)$$

• If we do not assume any structure in preferences then we get


$$\tilde{O}\left(rac{M\sqrt{Nn}}{\sqrt{T}}
ight)$$

# Giving user's an accept/reject choice

- Optimism in estimating preferences tends to raise prices
- Suppose a user accepts an item only if her reward is more that the offered price
- Then we have to lower the offered prices in proportion to the width of the confidence set
- This reduces the decay of regret in T to be

$$\tilde{O}\left(\frac{1}{T^{1/4}}\right)$$

## Experiments



ILAP: Interactive Learning for Allocation and Pricing (Our Algorithm)

**RWE: Recommendations without Exploration** 

IR: Interactive Recommendation CUCB: Combinatorial UCB

## Related Work

- Combinatorial multi-armed bandits: Audibert et al (2011), Chen et al (2013), Kveton et al (2015)
- Structured Linear Bandits: Combes et al (2017), Lu et al (2021)
- Bandits in economics: Liu et al (2020), Johari et al (2021), Jagadeesan (2021)
- Envy-free pricing: Guruswami et al (2005)
- Recommendation with capacity constraints: Christakopoulou (2017), Makhijani (2019)

## **Future Directions**

- Show multiple recommendations at once instead of one
- Learn from user choice and not require user feedback
- Extending to multi-sided markets
- Lower bounds on regrets
- Maximizing revenue instead of social welfare

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